Myanmar has never been the easiest member of ASEAN.
When Myanmar joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1997, its membership was already controversial. The United States and several other countries opposed the move because of the military government’s human rights record. ASEAN, however, went ahead with its decision to bring Myanmar into the regional bloc.
Nearly three decades later, Myanmar has become one of ASEAN’s biggest political headaches.
But the story is not as simple as saying Myanmar has always been ASEAN’s “troublesome child.”
From controversy to cautious hope
Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN has gone through several very different phases.
One of the most difficult moments came in 2007, when large anti-government protests spread across the country. Buddhist monks became highly visible participants in what became known as the Saffron Revolution.
The military government’s crackdown attracted international condemnation and put ASEAN in an uncomfortable position. The violence and treatment of protesters raised questions about how far ASEAN could go in responding to a crisis inside one of its own member states.
At the same time, Myanmar’s political situation eventually began to change.
In 2011, the military-backed government began a process of political and economic reforms. Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, and Myanmar gradually began moving away from decades of direct military rule.
Then came the 2015 election.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a decisive victory, creating hopes that Myanmar could finally move towards a more stable democratic future.
It was far from a perfect democracy. The military still retained enormous constitutional power, including control over key ministries and a guaranteed share of parliamentary seats. But for a while, Myanmar appeared to be moving in a different direction.
Then came 2021.
The coup that changed everything
In November 2020, the NLD won another major electoral victory.
The military, however, alleged that the election had been affected by widespread voter fraud. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the allegation that fraud was significant enough to change the result.
On February 1, 2021, just as the newly elected parliament was preparing to begin its session, the military seized power and detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior government officials.
For ASEAN, this was a completely different level of crisis.
The coup immediately tested some of the fundamental principles on which ASEAN operates: sovereignty, non-interference, consultation, consensus and regional stability.
ASEAN called for dialogue and a peaceful resolution. But it also faced a familiar problem: how do you respond to a crisis inside a member state without violating the principle of non-interference?
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus
In April 2021, ASEAN leaders met in Jakarta and agreed on what became known as the Five-Point Consensus.
The plan called for:
- An immediate cessation of violence.
- Constructive dialogue among all parties.
- The appointment of a special envoy to facilitate dialogue.
- Humanitarian assistance through ASEAN.
- A visit by the special envoy to Myanmar to meet relevant stakeholders.
The agreement was significant because it gave ASEAN a common framework for dealing with the crisis.
The problem was implementation.
Years later, ASEAN itself continues to acknowledge that there has been limited substantive progress. In 2025, ASEAN leaders expressed deep concern about the continuing conflict and humanitarian situation and again called for concrete action to implement the Five-Point Consensus.
Myanmar remained an ASEAN member, but its political representation at major ASEAN meetings was restricted to the non-political level.
And that is where the “troublesome child” metaphor becomes interesting.
Myanmar is no longer only Myanmar’s problem
The crisis inside Myanmar does not stop at its borders.
Conflict and instability have created humanitarian challenges, displacement and serious concerns along Myanmar’s borders with neighbouring countries. ASEAN has repeatedly warned that the continuing violence is affecting regional stability.
The crisis has also complicated ASEAN’s diplomatic position.
ASEAN cannot simply remove Myanmar from the organisation. At the same time, it cannot ignore what is happening inside the country.
So ASEAN has found itself walking a narrow line:
Engage Myanmar, but don’t appear to legitimise everything its authorities do.
Support dialogue, but avoid direct intervention.
Provide humanitarian assistance, but work through a framework that all sides can accept.
Maintain ASEAN unity, even when member states have different views on how Myanmar should be handled.
That is an extremely difficult balancing act.
So, is Myanmar really ASEAN’s troublesome child?
Perhaps.
But there is another way to look at it.
Myanmar may not only be exposing problems inside Myanmar. It may also be exposing the limitations of ASEAN itself.
ASEAN was built around consultation, consensus and respect for the sovereignty of its member states. These principles have helped very different countries cooperate despite major differences in political systems and national interests. The ASEAN Charter itself identifies consultation and consensus as a basic principle of decision-making.
But those same principles can make it difficult for ASEAN to respond quickly and forcefully when one member experiences a severe political crisis.
Myanmar has therefore become something larger than a single-country crisis.
It has become a test of ASEAN’s ability to balance sovereignty with human rights, non-interference with regional stability, and consensus with meaningful action.
The question is no longer simply:
How can ASEAN solve Myanmar’s crisis?
Perhaps the bigger question is:
What does Myanmar’s crisis tell us about ASEAN itself?