China is not part of ASEAN.
But try talking about Southeast Asia without talking about China.
It is almost impossible.
From trade and infrastructure to tourism, technology and geopolitics, China’s influence can be felt across Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, China is both an important economic partner and a complicated strategic neighbour.
That combination makes the relationship one of the most important stories in Asia.
It started with trade, but it became much bigger
ASEAN-China dialogue relations began in the early 1990s, and China became a full ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1996.
Since then, the relationship has expanded dramatically.
China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, while ASEAN has been China’s largest trading partner since 2019. In 2024, two-way merchandise trade reached around US$772 billion, representing about 20% of ASEAN’s total trade. Chinese investment in ASEAN also reached US$19.3 billion in the same year.
These numbers tell an important story.
China is not simply another country doing business with Southeast Asia.
It is deeply connected to the region’s economy.
Factories across Southeast Asia are part of supply chains connected to China. Chinese companies are involved in infrastructure, manufacturing, technology and energy projects. Millions of people across the region also have economic or cultural connections with China.
For ASEAN governments, this relationship is difficult to ignore.
But economics is only half the story
The complicated part begins when economics meets geopolitics.
Several ASEAN countries have overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea.
The Philippines and Vietnam, in particular, have had serious disputes with Beijing over maritime claims and activities.
At the same time, other ASEAN members have much closer economic and political relationships with China.
This means ASEAN does not have one single “China policy.”
Thailand may view China differently from Vietnam.
Singapore may approach the relationship differently from Cambodia.
The Philippines may have different security concerns from Laos.
Indonesia has its own strategic interests.
And this is one of ASEAN’s biggest challenges.
How do eleven countries with different interests develop a common regional position toward the world’s second-largest economy?
The Belt and Road question
China’s influence is not limited to trade.
The Belt and Road Initiative has brought Chinese financing and companies into infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia, including railways, ports, energy projects and other major infrastructure.
For developing economies, infrastructure investment can bring obvious benefits.
Better transport links can reduce costs.
New railways can connect markets.
Ports can improve trade.
Energy projects can support economic development.
But large foreign investment also raises questions about debt, transparency, environmental impact, strategic dependence and who ultimately benefits from these projects.
The debate is therefore rarely as simple as “China is good” or “China is bad.”
For ASEAN countries, the calculation is usually much more practical:
How can we benefit from China’s economic power without becoming too dependent on it?
ASEAN does not want to choose sides
This becomes even more important because China is not the only major power interested in Southeast Asia.
The United States, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea and the European Union all have significant economic or strategic interests in the region.
ASEAN’s preferred approach has generally been to maintain relationships with multiple major powers rather than become part of a bloc dominated by one.
This is where the idea of “ASEAN centrality” becomes important.
The goal is for ASEAN to remain at the centre of regional cooperation and to provide platforms where major powers can engage with Southeast Asian countries.
In theory, this gives smaller and middle-sized countries more room to manoeuvre.
But maintaining that balance is becoming increasingly difficult as competition between China and the United States becomes sharper.
The South China Sea problem
Perhaps nowhere is the China-ASEAN relationship more complicated than in the South China Sea.
The sea is important for trade, fisheries, energy resources and strategic access.
Several ASEAN members have overlapping claims with China, while Beijing maintains extensive claims of its own.
For ASEAN, this creates a difficult diplomatic balancing act.
If ASEAN takes a stronger position against China, it risks damaging a hugely important economic relationship and may struggle to maintain unity among its members.
If ASEAN says too little, individual member states may feel that the organisation is not adequately defending their interests.
There is no easy answer.
So, is China a threat or an opportunity?
The simplest answer is: it depends on what you are looking at.
Economically, China is an enormous opportunity for ASEAN.
Strategically, China presents difficult questions.
Politically, ASEAN countries have different views.
And geographically, China is simply too close and too important to ignore.
That is why the ASEAN-China relationship is unlikely to be defined by friendship or rivalry alone.
It will probably be a mixture of both cooperation and competition.
ASEAN’s challenge will be maintaining enough unity to protect its collective interests while allowing individual member states to maintain their own relationships with Beijing.
The region does not necessarily want to choose between China and everyone else.
It wants room to choose for itself.
And perhaps that is the real story of ASEAN and China.
China may be ASEAN’s biggest economic partner.
But ASEAN’s biggest priority may be making sure that partnership does not determine its entire future.